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1 INTRODUCTION
A firm that wants to reduce the size of its workforce or change its composition,
may choose between three methods to get rid of the redundant employees. It may
induce employees to quit, it may dismiss employees, or it make employees eli-
gible for disability benefits. In case of an induced quit there are no separation
costs involved. The other two methods have costs that may differ substantially. In
the following we will not attempt to give a comprehensive analysis of the choice
and the use of the three methods but we restrict ourselves to the two methods
that involve costs. In particular we focus on the use of enrolment into disability
as an alternative to dismissal.
The rules that determine the eligibility for disability benefits restrict these ben-
efits to persons who are no longer able to work due to health problems. Because
of the imperfect verifiability of these health problems and the lower costs for
both employer and employees associated with a transition to disability, it has been
and still is attractive to use disability as an alternative to dismissal.
In The Netherlands the number of claimants of disability benefits is substan-
tially larger than in other European countries. For example, in 1990 there were
139 claimants for every 1000 workers in The Netherlands. For Sweden this num-
ber was 78, for Germany 43 ~Aarts, Dercksen, and De Jong ~1993!!. This raises
the suspicion that a substantial fraction of the claimants was made eligible for
enrolment because of redundancy, and not because of poor health. This suspicion
is confirmed in a number of empirical studies which find that up to 50% of dis-
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ability enrolment is related to redundancy. However, these studies are based on
data collected before the 1987 major restructuring of the disability benefit sys-
tem. The main objective of this restructuring was a reduction of the inflow into
disability. Sofar, there has not been an empirical analysis of the relationship be-
tween disability enrolment and redundancies after the restructuring of the disabil-
ity benefit system.
In this paper we use post-1987 data to investigate empirically to what extent
separations into disability are still used as an alternative to dismissals. We use
data on the dismissal and disability rates of Dutch firms to estimate the fraction
of the desired dismissals that was channeled into disability. We find that about
10% of the new disability claimants became eligible because their job was re-
dundant. Since this is substantially less than the numbers found in previous stud-
ies based on pre-1987 data we conclude that the social security reform of 1987
reduced the use of disability enrolment to avoid dismissals.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief history of disability
insurance and describes the arrangements with respect to dismissal and eligibility
for disability benefits and discusses the incentives that result from these arrange-
ments. Section 3 discusses previous empirical work on disability and unemploy-
ment. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the statistical model and
the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 DISMISSALS AND DISABILITY: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
In 1967 the comprehensive disability insurance for employees ~WAO! was intro-
duced in The Netherlands.1 Under the terms of this law workers were insured
against wage loss due to long-term disability. From then on if a worker became
ill, he was allowed to claim a benefit under the illness scheme for a maximum
period of one year. After that he could claim a disability benefit. Workers were
entitled to disability benefits after a so called disability examination, which con-
sisted not only of a medical examination but also of an investigation of the la-
bour market position of the worker. A worker could be considered disabled if
there was no suitable job for him at his own educational level in his previous
occupation. Furthermore, unemployment was ‘internalized,’ which means that
those workers who were considered to be partially ~more than 15%! disabled,
could collect full disability benefits because it was assumed that partially dis-
abled were doomed to remain unemployed. The benefit had a maximum of 80%
of the wage in the last job. Disability benefits could be collected until age 65.
Since the introduction of the comprehensive disability insurance the number
of workers collecting disability benefits has increased from 150,000 to about
1 In The Netherlands disability rules are given in the ‘Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheid’ ~WAO!
and the ‘Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet’ ~AAW!. Privately employed workers get benefits
through the WAO-programme, whereas the AAW covers all residents, aged 18–64.
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850,000 in the beginning of the 1990s. This huge increase in the number of dis-
ability benefits induced the government to change the structure of the disability
benefit system.2 In 1981 the rules to calculate the wage in the last job changed:
tips and overtime were no longer included in the calculations. In 1985–1987 the
maximum percentage of 80% of the previous wage was reduced to 70%. In 1987
there was a major restructuring of the disability benefit system of which the main
objective was to reduce the inflow into disability. The most important change was
the abolition of the ‘internalization of unemployment’ rules. Partially disabled
workers were considered as such and were expected to find a job or claim un-
employment benefits for their remaining work capacity. In the early 1990s there
were some further changes. For employers the disability insurance premium was
experience-rated, the disability examination no longer took the availability of suit-
able jobs with respect to education and previous occupation into consideration,
the duration of the benefit was limited to five years after which a re-examination
had to take place and, all disabled workers younger than 50 years had to be re-
examined.
Our data relate to the end of the 1980s, a period in which the institutional
arrangements with respect to dismissal and eligibility for disability benefits still
provided incentives for employers and employees to use disability as an alterna-
tive to dismissal.3
A dismissal occurs if a labour contract is dissolved unilaterally by a firm. The
Netherlands has, like many other European countries, laws that protect workers
from unjustified dismissals. The employer must give a reason for the dismissal
and not all reasons are acceptable. We can distinguish between three types of
reasons.
First, an employer may dismiss a worker immediately, if the worker fails to
perform his tasks. The worker may challenge this decision in court. Second, an
employee may be dismissed, if the relationship between the individual employee
and the employer has become untenable. Third, a dismissal may be the conse-
quence of the redundancy of the employee’s job. In order to dismiss a worker for
one of these reasons, an employer must either ask permission from the regional
employment office or obtain the approval of a district court.4 Usually a permis-
sion from the employment office is needed in case of the dismissal of a group of
workers. Approval by the court may be preferred by the employee, because court
settlements, in contrast to permissions by the employment office, usually grant
redundancy pay to the dismissed employees. In 1990 62,000 permits were given
by the employment offices and 10,000 dismissals were approved by the courts.5
2 We do not discuss all the changes but restrict ourselves to some important examples.
3 See also Aarts and De Jong ~1992, chapters 2, 5 and 8!.
4 See article 1639w of the Dutch civil code.
5 The actual number of dismissals is higher because these numbers include dismissals of groups of
workers, though it is likely that the court mainly has cases of individual workers.
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Dismissing workers by either one of these methods is costly. First, the dis-
missal procedure takes time. The firm has to wait until the employment office or
the court has reached a decision, which takes four to six weeks.6 If the dismissal
is approved, there is a period of advance notice with a maximum of thirteen
weeks. This waiting period is expensive for the firm, because it has to pay the
wage of the redundant employee. The employment office does not award redun-
dancy pay. In case of a group dismissal, i.e. more than 20 workers within three
months, redundancy pay may be claimed by unions. Redundancy pay may also
be imposed in a court settlement. Finally, some, mainly large, firms supplement
the unemployment benefits, which pay 70% of the last wage, to 100% for some
period.7 After dismissal a firm is not allowed to replace a worker within
3 months ~Aarts and De Jong ~1992!!, and this may cause additional costs to the
employer.
Dismissals are also costly for workers. The unemployed worker has to search
for a job.8 The period that the unemployed worker receives unemployment ben-
efits depends on his work history and age. After exhaustion of the unemployment
benefits the worker may apply for means-tested public assistance.
A transition into disability is costly for employers for several reasons. A worker
only qualifies for disability benefits if he has been on sick leave for a year. Sick
pay starts after two days of sick leave, and workers receive 70% of gross wage.
Most firms supplement sick pay to the level of the net wage and also pay for the
first two days ~Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment ~1989!!. Because ill-
ness insurance is only partially experience-rated,9 firms bear only a fraction of
the direct costs of a sick leave. A sick leave has no effect on the worker’s in-
come. After one year a sick worker may apply for disability benefits. As indi-
cated before, workers get both a medical examination and an investigation of their
labour market position. On the basis of these examinations an expert determines
what type of work the worker should be able to do. There is strong evidence that
not all disability entrants were carefully examined. In 1987 37% of the applicants
got a so-called ‘reduced procedure’ which did not involve a medical examination
~Aarts and De Jong ~1992!!.
Disability insurance is only partially experience-rated since the insurance pre-
miums are only industry-specific and do not depend on the disability record of
the individual firm. Disability benefits are higher than benefits of long-term un-
employed workers. Moreover, during the first ~two! year~s! of disability 62% of
the firms paid the difference between the disability benefit and the previous net wage
of their former employees ~Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment ~1989!!.
6 Cases in which there is pro forma defence on behalf of the worker last on average 2 weeks.
7 A survey of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment ~1989! shows that 7.5 per cent of the
firms supplemented the income of dismissed workers.
8 Except for persons older than 57.5 years, who will receive unemployment benefit until their re-
tirement.
9 The premium only depends on the industry of the firm.
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All in all, the choices of employers and employees with respect to the disabil-
ity enrolment depend on the balance of costs and benefits. Employers who want
to get rid of workers and have two options in doing so may choose the cheapest
option. Employees will consider the expected residual lifetime income of the two
options and may choose the option with the highest expected income. Due to
incomplete experience rating employers may prefer disability over dismissal as a
method to get rid of redundant employees. Because of the terms of the benefit
systems redundant employees may prefer disability over long-term unemploy-
ment ~Aarts and De Jong ~1992!, chapter 8!. For both employers and employees
disability may be the optimal choice.
3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Sofar, all empirical studies on the relationship between disability and dismissals
refer mainly to the period before 1987, the year of the major restructuring of the
disability benefit system. Some of the studies investigate the relationship between
disability enrolment and economic variables. If a relationship is found this may
indicate an improper use of the disability insurance. Other studies try to estimate
the unemployment component of disability more precisely. Table 1 presents an
overview of these empirical studies.
TABLE 1 – EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON DUTCH DISABILITY
Study Data set Unemployment
component
Economic variables
Disability inflow
Van den Bosch and
Petersen ~1983!
16 branches
of industry
1968–1979
share of profits in added
value, number of workers
employed
Roodenburg and
Wong Meeuw Hing ~1985!
disaggregatea!
1971–1982
2%–35% percentage of regional
unemployment
Aarts and De Jong
~1992, chapter 5!
2808 workers 33%–51% expected future work
capacity
Aarts and De Jong
~1992, chapter 8!
1311 firmsb! firm size, employment
change
Disability stock
Westerhout ~1995! aggregate
1973–1992
50% replacement rates disability
and unemployment, number
of inactive workers
a! Disaggregate to region, age, gender and economic sector.
b! The firms have at least 50 workers.
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For each study the table presents the main features of the data set and an
estimate of the unemployment component, that is the percentage of workers col-
lecting disability benefits who are in fact unemployed. Furthermore, the table pre-
sents the main explanatory variables. These studies are classified according to
whether they use stock or inflow data.
Van den Bosch and Petersen ~1983! analyze time-series data on Dutch indus-
tries that cover a large part of the 1970s. They show that the growth of disabil-
ity-incidence rates in the 1970s can to a large degree be explained by a deterio-
ration of the economic situation in The Netherlands as indicated by the
development of profits and employment. Their study also shows that the change
in the perception of health is also an important determinant of the growth in dis-
ability transfers.
Roodenburg and Wong Meeuw Hing ~1985! use time series of mainly 1970s
data disaggregated with respect to region, age, gender, and industry to analyze
the relationship between inflow into disability and unemployment. They conclude
that in 1981 about 35 per cent of the annual inflow was related to unemploy-
ment.
Aarts and De Jong ~1992, chapter 5! investigate to what extent workers who
enrol in disability insurance are in fact able to work. Using microdata on workers
of the 1980 inflow into disability they demonstrate that about 30–50 per cent of
the workers collecting disability benefits were in fact ‘hidden’ unemployed work-
ers because they were ’capable of performing a suitable job.’
Aarts and De Jong ~1992, chapter 8! use data on disability enrolment in 1311
firms with at least 50 workers, observed in the years 1978–1979. They estimate a
disability equation and conclude that there are underlying firm-specific economic
reasons for disability enrolment. Aarts and De Jong also find that inter-firm dif-
ferences in disability incidence are related to costs and benefits of retraining and
replacing marginally efficient employees.
Westerhout ~1995! uses time-series data of the period 1973–1992. So, his data
include information before and after the 1987 reform of the disability benefit sys-
tem. Unfortunately these are stock data so that the after-1987 data also contain
information on workers who enrolled into the disability programme before 1987.
Therefore, it is impossible to isolate the impact on the new disability enrolment
after 1987. Westerhout shows that about half of the participation in disability
schemes can be characterised as hidden unemployment.
We conclude that the various empirical studies show that before 1987 up to
50 per cent of the disability enrolment was due to non-health reasons. Hence,
there is empirical evidence that before the restructuring of the disability benefit
system disability enrolment has been used to a substantial degree to get rid of
redundant employees.
34 W.H.J. HASSINK, J.C. VAN OURS AND G. RIDDER
4 THE DATA
Our data are from a panel survey of Dutch firms, conducted by the Organisation
for Labour Market Research ~OSA!. We use the first two waves of this survey,
1988 and 1990.10 The sampling units are organisations, which we refer to as
firms. These firms are from all economic sectors including government and edu-
cation, and have at least 10 employees. The sample is stratified according to eco-
nomic activity and size of the firm ~three classes: 10–49, 50–99, 1001 workers!.
In each wave two questionnaires are used. The first questionnaire used by enu-
merators gathers qualitative characteristics and financial data of the firm. Firms
that responded to this questionnaire received a second postal questionnaire to col-
lect additional quantitative information about the firm. The response to the sec-
ond questionnaire is 75–80% of the response to the first one.
In 1988 the sample consisted of 2041 firms, in 1990 of 2017 firms. A large
number of the 1988 firms did not respond in 1990, had a substantial change in
activities or experienced a merger. Restricting ourselves to the remaining firms,
we retain a gross sample of 1168 firms. If we remove those firms of which we
do not know dismissal rates ~1988: 359 firms, 1990: 435 firms! and/or disability
rates ~1990: 433 firms!, the variables of interest in this study, we obtain an in-
termediate sample of 559 firms.11 After removing firms that did not answer ques-
tions on the explanatory variables to be used in the empirical analysis, a net
sample of 225 firms remains.12
Our net sample contains substantially less firms than the original sample.
Table 2 presents the distribution of firms over economic sectors in the three
samples and gives a first impression of the selectivity of our dataset.
Because our statistical model contains lagged variables and we only have in-
formation on two years, we use a cross-section of firms. This means that the
information used for the estimates is mainly from 1990. Definitions of the vari-
ables in our analysis are given in the Appendix. Employment is measured as the
number of employees in December of each year irrespective of the number of
hours they worked. Workers with temporary contracts shorter than one year are
excluded.13 In our empirical analysis both dismissals and transitions to disability
are expressed as rates, defined as fractions of employment at the start of the year.
10 The surveys were carried out from March 1989 until March 1990, and May 1991 until Decem-
ber 1991, respectively.
11 The sole purpose of this intermediate sample is to investigate whether the selection introduces a bias.
12 The main reason for the loss of cases in going from the intermediate to the net sample is the
lack of response to the questions ‘output’ ~response of 49%! and ‘wage’ ~response of 38%!. 5 firms
are not included in the net sample because they contain an outlier in one of the variables ~a outlier
for L ~9 standard deviations from the mean!, 1 for f88 ~10 standard deviations from the mean!, 3 for
Y90/L90 2 Y88/L88 ~at least 7.5 standard deviations from the mean!. In the net sample f90 is 0.173
maximum and d90 is 0.100 maximum.
13 On average, the fraction of workers with a temporary contract shorter than one year is 9% of the
total number of employees.
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Table 3 shows that there are many firms in both our net and our intermediate
sample without dismissals or separations into disability in one or both years. In
the net sample only 20% of the 225 firms have positive dismissal and disability
rates in both years, while in the intermediate sample it is 16%. The differences
between the net sample and intermediate sample are not very large.
TABLE 2 – FIRMS BY ECONOMIC SECTOR IN SHARES: NET, INTERMEDIATE AND GROSS
SAMPLE a!
Net sample Intermediate sample Gross sample
SBI 0–3 0.29 0.25 0.31
SBI 5 0.05 0.08 0.08
SBI 6 0.05 0.09 0.10
SBI 7, 8 0.24 0.21 0.22
SBI 4 and 90 0.17 0.14 0.11
SBI 92 0.03 0.05 0.04
SBI 9, except 90, 92 0.17 0.18 0.14
1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of firms 225 559 1168
a! The SBI classes are according to the Standard Industrial Classification of The Neth-
erlands, Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, 1974. The seven strata are: agriculture,
mining and manufacturing ~0–3!; construction ~5!; trade, hotels, cafés, restaurants and re-
pair of consumer goods ~6!; transport, storage, communication, banking, insurance ~7, 8!;
government and public utilities ~4 and 90!; education ~92!; other services ~9, except 90
and 92!.
TABLE 3 – DISMISSALS ~F! AND TRANSITIONS INTO DISABILITY ~D!, PERCENTAGE OF
FIRMS, NET AND INTERMEDIATE SAMPLE a!
Net sample Intermediate sample
F5 0, D5 0 0.45 0.50
F5 0, D. 0 0.24 0.21
F. 0, D5 0 0.11 0.13
F. 0, D. 0 0.20 0.16
1.00 1.00
N 225 559
a! N is the total number of observations used.
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Table 4 shows to what extent the dependent variables, the dismissal and dis-
ability rates, are affected by the selection process. The average dismissal rates are
similar in the gross and net samples. The average disability rates are slightly dif-
ferent, but the difference can be attributed to sampling variability. Table 4 also
shows that there are no substantial differences between the averages of other var-
iables in both samples.
We conclude that the observed characteristics of the net sample do not sub-
stantially differ from those of less selective samples.
TABLE 4 – MEANS OF THE VARIABLES, NET AND GROSS SAMPLE a!
Variable Net sample Gross sample Number of firms
in gross sample b!
Dependent variables
f90 0.0081 ~0.001! 0.0078 ~0.001! 733
d90 0.0074 ~0.001! 0.0078 ~0.001! 735
Firm characteristics
w90 2w88 0.190 ~0.04! 0.216 ~0.03! 439
Y90/L90 2 Y88/L88 0.210 ~0.07! 0.161 ~0.04! 572
q90 0.065 ~0.004! 0.076 ~0.003! 737
f88 0.0080 ~0.001! 0.010 ~0.001! 809
L89 1.29 ~0.10! 1.17 ~0.05! 835
Adjustment costs
Start-up $ 300 days 0.222 ~0.03! 0.261 ~0.01! 1168
Personnel characteristics
Age $ 50 0.129 ~0.005! 0.126 ~0.003! 844
Part-time 0.196 ~0.02! 0.182 ~0.01! 830
Working conditions
Bad conditions 0.787 ~0.03! 0.738 ~0.01! 1168
Illness in 1988 0.072 ~0.003! 0.071 ~0.002! 768
a! Standard deviations of the means are in parentheses. Units of the variables f, d and q
are fractions of employment at the beginning of the year; age, part-time and illness in
1988 are fractions of employment at the end of the year; bad conditions and start-up are
dummy variables; L is in hundreds of workers; w90 2w88 is the change of the yearly gross
real wage, measured in then thousands of guilders ~average w88 is 4.19!; ~Y90/L90 2 Y88/
L88! is in hundred thousands of guilders ~average Y88/L88 equals 3.61!.
b! For every variable the number of firms in the gross sample is equal to 1168 minus the
number of missing observations for that specific variable; the number of firms in the net
sample is 225.
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5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 The Statistical Model
A firm has a desired dismissal rate ~ f *! and a ‘true’ disability rate ~d*!. Both
rates are unobserved. f * consists of the fraction of workers that should be dis-
missed because of economis reasons. d* is the fraction of workers that enrol into
disability, because they are unable to work for health reasons. d* cannot be in-
fluenced by the firm in the short run, although over a longer period of time it
may be affected by variables that are under control of the firm, for instance work-
ing conditions. f * and d* are both affected by a vector of exogenous variables
x1. In addition, f * is influenced by a vector of exogenous variables x2 and d*
depends on a vector of exogenous variables x3. We specify a linear regression
model for f * and d*:
fi*5 b18x1i1 b28x2i1 u1i , ~1a!
di*5 b38x1i1 b48x3i1 u2i , ~1b!
where
Eu1iu2i5 0
Euki5 0
Euki2 5 tk2
k5 1, 2
i5 1, . . . , N
Index i refer to firm i. N is the number of firms, which in our case is 225. The
assumption that the disturbances are uncorrelated after controlling for firm char-
acteristics reflects the fact that the disability rate is given to the firm.
Instead of f * and d* we observe realized dismissal and disability rates ~f and
d!. If a firm directs a fraction l of its redundancies into disability, f is equal to
~12l! f * and l f * enrols into disability in the current year. Of course, these work-
ers must be on sick leave for 12 months and hence, this strategy can only be
used if there is a sufficiently large number of workers on sick leave. d is equal to
l f *1 d*. Substituting in ~1a! and ~1b! gives:
fi5 ~12 l! fi*5 g18x1i1 g28x2i1 v1i ~2a!
di5 l fi*1 di*5 g38x1i1 g48x2i1 g58x3i1 v2i ~2b!
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with
Evki5 0 , k5 1, 2
Ev1i2 5 s12 5 ~12 l!2t 12
Ev2i2 5 s 22 5 l2t21 1 t 22
Ev1iv2i5 s12 5 l~12 l!t 12
rv5 s12/~s1s2!
g1 5 ~12 l!b1
g2 5 ~12 l!b2
g3 5 lb1 1 b3
g4 5 lb2
g5 5 b4
We complete the specification by choosing the variables that are included in x1,
x2 and x3. The variables in x1, which affect both the autonomous disability rate
and the latent dismissal rate are the growth ~from 1988 to 1990! of the average
real wage and the growth ~from 1988 to 1990! of the average real productivity.
Wage growth and productivity growth are both related to labour costs and there-
fore may affect the decision of the employer to reduce or expand their workforce
in whatever way. The variables in x2, which are supposed to influence the de-
sired dismissal rate are the quit rate, the lagged dismissal rate, the number of
workers, the training period on the job, and the share of workers older than
50 years. These variables are quite traditional, all possibly influencing decisions
of employers with respect to the optimal size of the workforce. The quit rate is
complementary to the dismissal rate: the more voluntary separations there are the
less involuntary separations are needed and vice versa. If the lagged dismissal
rate has an influence this may reflect partial adjustment of the workforce. Fur-
thermore, large firms may want to get rid of their workers more easily. Finally,
the start-up period may be important because this reflects to what extent the firm
has invested in its workforce and the age of the workforce may be important
because the firing costs for older workers are higher.14 The variables in x3 which
influence the autonomous disability rate are the share of part-time workers, the
14 Hassink ~1996! provides additional motivation for the choice of the variables in x1 and x2.
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working conditions and the share of workers on sick leave. The first variable
indicates to what extent workers are at risk of becoming disabled presupposing
that longer working hours lead to more physical and psychical stress. The latter
two variables are direct indications of the risks of becoming disabled. Table 3
presents the averages of the variables in our sample.
The statistical model must allow for the zeros in the dependent variables, and
for the correlation of the disturbances. Hence, we estimate the model ~2a!–~2b!
as a bivariate Tobit. For ease of exposition we rewrite ~2a, b! in obvious nota-
tion:
fi5 v18z1i1 v1i
di5 v28z2i1 v2i . ~3!
Define the indicator functions as:
Iki5 I~ki. 0! , k5 f, d .
The likelihood function of ~3! is:
)
i5 1
N Ff2 Sfi2 v18z1is1 , di2 v28z2is2 ; rvDG
I f i Idi
p3F1 12 v18z1i2 rv
s1
s2
~di2 v28z2i!
s1~12 rv2!1/2
2 p f1 Sdi2 v28z2is2 D4
Idi~12 I f i!
p3F1 12 v28z2i2 rv
s2
s1
~fi2 v18z1i!
s2~12 rv2!1/2
2 p f1Sfi2 v18z1is1 D4
I f i~12 Idi!
p FF2 S2 v18z1is1 , 2 v28z2is2 ; rvDG
~12 I f i! ~12 Idi!
~4!
where f1~.!, F1~.! ~f2~.,.; rv!, F2~.,.; rv!! the univariate ~bivariate! normal p.d.f
and c.d.f., respectively. Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are ob-
tained by maximizing ~4! with respect to the parameters.
Estimates of the parameters of the structural model ~1! can be obtained from
the reduced form parameters by means of the minimum distance method ~Cham-
berlain ~1984!!. There are 22 parameters of the reduced form model ~2a, b! which
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can be arranged in a 22-dimensional vector:
u 5 ~g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, s1, s2, rv,! .
The structural model follows from the reduced form model by imposing the re-
striction
g~p! 5 u ~5!
where p is a 17-dimensional vector of structural parameters15:
p 5 ~l, b1, b2, b3, b4, t1, t2! .
Let uN be the maximum likelihood estimator of u. An efficient minimum dis-
tance estimate of p is obtained by minimizing the quadratic form:
QN~p! 5 ~uN2 g~p!!8~varuN!21~uN2 g~p!! .
The structural model is exactly identified if the dimensions of b and p are equal.
The dimension of our u is larger than that of p, which means that our structural
model is overidentified. It is possible to test the overidentifying restrictions. Un-
der the null hypothesis that the restrictions are satisfied QN has a Chi-square dis-
tribution and the number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of overi-
dentifying restrictions.
5.2 Estimation Results
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the reduced form model
~3! are reported in the first column of Table 5. The other columns give the struc-
tural form parameters of model ~2!. These were obtained by the minimum dis-
tance method. The second column gives the structural estimates for the specifi-
cation of section 5.1. The exclusion of 5 variables that appear in the dismissal
equation from the disability equation allows us to identify the structural param-
eters. With this specification the structural model is overidentified. The key pa-
rameter l is equal to 0.095, which means that 9.5% of the desired dismissals is
through enrolment in disability insurance, or expressed as a fraction in the inflow
into disability, that 12% of that inflow consists of employees that would have
been dismissed otherwise. The test of overidentifying restrictions, which provides
a check of the specification, rejects the specification in the second column. There-
15 ~g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, s1, s2, rv! is related to b1, b2, b3, ß4, t1, t2, l! by means of the following
restrictions: g1 5 ~12 l!b1, g2 5 ~12 l!b2, g3 5 lb1 1 b3, g4 5 lb2, g5 5 b4, s1 5 ~12 l!t1,
s2 5 l
2t1
2 1 t2
2!0.5, rv5 l p ti /~l2t12 1 t22!0.5.
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TABLE 5 – ESTIMATION RESULTS BIVARIATE TOBIT REGRESSION, REDUCED AND
STRUCTURAL FORMS a!
Reduced form Structural form
I
Structural form
II
Dismissal rate
w90 2w88 0.01 ~1.66!* 0.013 ~2.36!** 0.012 ~2.33!**
Y90/L90 2 Y88/L88 20.0006 ~0.13! 20.0009 ~0.25! 20.0007 ~0.20!
q90 20.039 ~0.52! 20.049 ~0.85! 20.044 ~0.80!
f88 0.402 ~2.05!** 0.472 ~3.06!** 0.440 ~2.93!**
L89 0.005 ~2.08!** 0.007 ~3.30!** 0.005 ~2.95!**
Start-up $ 300 days 20.019 ~1.75!* 20.023 ~2.72!** 20.021 ~2.56!**
Age $ 50 20.062 ~1.15! 20.076 ~1.80!* 20.070 ~1.70!*
Constant 20.026 ~2.13!** 20.030 ~3.16!** 20.027 ~2.97!**
s1 0.048 ~10.32!*** – –
t1 – 0.053 ~27.03!*** 0.051 ~26.67!**
Disability rate
w90 2w88 20.007 ~1.79!* 20.008 ~3.01!** 20.008 ~2.87!**
Y90/L90 2 Y88/L88 0.002 ~0.98! 0.002 ~1.20! 0.002 ~1.22!
q90 20.025 ~0.67! – –
f88 0.108 ~0.99! – –
L89 0.004 ~3.45!** – 0.004 ~4.38!**
Start-up $ 300 days 20.006 ~1.22! – –
Age $ 50 20.029 ~0.99! – –
Part-time 20.012 ~1.29! 20.010 ~1.60! 20.012 ~1.89!*
Bad conditions 0.046 ~0.88! 0.060 ~1.63! 0.050 ~1.36!
Illness 1988 0.192 ~3.46!** 0.176 ~4.52!*** 0.189 ~4.86!**
Constant 20.022 ~2.74!** 20.017 ~3.66!*** 20.025 ~5.03!**
s2 0.026 ~12.07!*** – –
t2 – 20.025 ~65.79!*** 20.025 ~95.24!**
rv 0.085 ~0.82! – –
l – 0.095 ~2.96!** 0.063 ~1.86!*
x ~5!
2
– 11.95** 2.46
N 225 225 225
* Statistically significant from zero at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant from zero at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant from zero at the 1% level.
a! Absolute t-values are in parentheses; N is the number of observations used to estimate
the model; sk, k5 1, 2, is the standard error of the regression of the reduced form esti-
mates; tk, k5 1, 2, is the standard error of the regression of the structural form; rv is the
correlation coefficient in the error structure of the reduced form; x ~5!2 ~x ~4!2 ! is a Chi-square
test on the overidentifying restrictions with 5 ~4! degrees of freedom.
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fore we experimented with other specifications by including some additional var-
iables in the disability equation. The smallest estimate of l was obtained when
we included employment in 1989 in the disability equation. Moreover, the 4
overidentifying restrictions are not rejected for that specification, which strongly
supports this specification. The estimation results in the third column of Table 4
show that the other structural parameters do not change much. The structural pa-
rameter estimates in columns 2 and 3 are as expected ~see also Hassink ~1996!!.
In the dismissal equation wage growth is significantly positive, as are the lagged
firing rate and lagged employment. Training costs have a significantly negative
effect on dismissals. Wage growth has a significantly positive effect and absence
due to illness has a significantly negative effect on the disability rate.
The estimates of l in the second and third columns give bounds on our esti-
mate of the fraction of dismissals that is channeled into disability. That fraction
is between 0.063 and 0.095, which implies that between 8 and 12% of the inflow
into disability consists of dismissals.16
If we compare our results with those from previous studies it is obvious that
we find a much smaller part of the disability enrolment is due to dismissals. In-
stead of a share up to 50% we find a share of approximately 10%. The main
difference between the previous studies and ours is that the previous studies use
data from before 1987 major change in the disability benefit system while we use
data from after that change. This comparison is indirect and of course we would
have preferred a direct comparison of the situation before and after the restruc-
turing of the benefit system. However, since there are no data for a direct com-
parison we stick to the indirect one. We conclude that there has been a decline in
the use of disability enrolment for purposes which have nothing to do with health.
And, we conclude that this decline is probably due to the restructuring of the
disability benefit system.
6 CONCLUSIONS
If a firm wants to reduce its workforce, it may dismiss some of its workers. Al-
ternatively, it may make some workers eligible for disability benefits. Upon ex-
amination these workers formally satisfy the conditions for disability enrolment.
Because these conditions allow for a rather liberal interpretation of disability,
these workers could have stayed in their job had they not become redundant.
Note that this behaviour may not be in conflict with social security laws, because
the workers satisfy the conditions for disability enrolment. Previous empirical
studies find that before the 1987 reform of the disability benefit system up to
50% of the disability enrolment was related to redundancy of workers. We have
16 A plausible alternative is to include the fraction of workers over 50 in the disability equation.
However, the coefficient is not significantly different from 0, the estimate of l 5 0.094 and the over-
identifying restrictions are rejected.
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demonstrated that at the end of the 1980s employers in The Netherlands still used
disability enrolment as an alternative to dismissals. Our estimates imply that about
10% of the transitions into disability are due to redundancy of the worker. An
implication of our result is that also after the social security reform of 1987 dis-
ability enrolment was used by some employers and employees to avoid dis-
missal. However, comparing our results with those from previous analyses we
conclude that this type of behaviour is much less common than before the re-
form.
APPENDIX
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES
The variables are defined as follows. The quotes are translations of the relevant
questions in the questionnaire.
– Employment, L:
‘How many workers were employed in your organization in December 1988
~1990! ~excluding temporary workers!. This concerns the number of employees
irrespective of the number of hours worked.’ The numbers of employees in
December 1987 and December 1989 are constructed by means of the hires ~H!
and the separations ~S! of employees during 1988 ~1990!, which are measured
in the survey: Lt21 5 Lt2Ht1 St.
– Dismissals, F, and transitions into distability, D:
‘How many employees left your organization in 1988 ~1990!, excluding em-
ployees with a temporary contract shorter than one year.’ The questionnaire
distinguishes 5 reasons for leaving the firm:
– pension, early retirement, death;
– separations because of disability ~D!;
– dismissal ~F!;
– quit ~Q!;
– end of temporary contract with a duration . one year.
– Wage, w:
The annual gross wage in the organization at the time of the survey. The em-
ployer is asked to distinguish the salary levels of the employees in the three
groups where all have an equal number of employees. For each group, the
maximum and the minimum wage are registered. The average wage is con-
structed as Si~Li /L!p ~wimin1wimax!/2; where wmin and wmax are the minimum
and the maximum wage level, respectively. Li is the number of employees in
each group. The nominal wage is defined by 1988: 100, 1990: 103.
– Sales, Y:
‘Sales of the firm before taxes in thousands of guilders in 1988 ~1990!.’ Un-
fortunately the questionnaire is not more specific about the tax. Rather we
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would have used the value added of the firm, but this information is not avail-
able. Nominal sales are defined by 1988: 100, 1990: 103.
– Training period:
Dummy variable which is one in case of a start-up period longer than
300 days. ~This variable is from the first questionnaire gathering qualitative
information.!
– Age $ 50:
Share of employees older than 50 years.
– Part-time:
Share of part-time employees in December.
– Bad working conditions:
Dummy variable which is one in case of physically ~or mentally! strenuous
working conditions in the firm. ~This variable is from the first questionnaire
gathering qualitative information.!
– Illness:
Average share of employees absent due to illness in 1988.
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Summary
DISMISSAL THROUGH DISSABILITY
If a firm wants to reduce its workforce, it may dismiss some of its workers. Alternatively, it may
make workers eligible for disability benefits. Upon examination these workers formally satisfy the
conditions for disability enrolment. Because these conditions allow for a rather liberal interpretation
of disability, these workers could have stayed in their job had they not become redundant. We use
data on Dutch firms to show that at the end of the 1980s about 10 per cent of the observed inflow
into disability were in fact dismissals. Comparing our results with those from previous studies we
conclude that due to the social security reform of 1987 the use of disability enrolment to avoid dis-
missals has been substantially reduced.
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